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Full text of "Poland Russia and Great Britain 1941-1945"

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define the future Western frontier of Poland as being on the Oder and
the Lusatian Nissa, that is, in square miles, roughly half of what Poland
was to lose in the East.
However, all this talk of compensation was to prove a fallacy when,
after the Yalta agreement, the Polish independence faded into the mists
of the * might-have been '. . . .
The Polish Republic was to be partitioned,, not between sovereign
Powers but between Soviet White Ruthenia, Soviet Lithuania., Soviet
Ukraine and the Soviet Polish Republics of the Soviet Union. In the
eighteenth century as in 1939, Poland had indeed been partitioned.,
but in 1945^ with the strict centralisation of the Soviet Republics to
Moscow, and taking into consideration that the Republics have less
home-rule than the counties of England., it was simply the annexation
of the whole of Poland by Russia. The e compensation * at Germany's
expense only meant that these provinces Poland was to receive, would
be incorporated into the Soviet Union as part of a new Stalin's Poland.
The odium of c compensation * would be with Poland,, the profit with
Russia. It would merely be a repetition of the story of the c Curzon
Line ' which had already ceased to be a problem as far as the Soviets
were concerned, the N.K.V.D. authorities had long since been installed and
their machinery was in motion throughout the whole of Poland, in Wilno
as in Warsaw, in Lwow as in Poznan.
In their Statement of February 13, the Polish Government referred
to the Yalta verdict as the c Fifth Partition' of their country, and the
British Government banned the broadcasting of this Statement. The
phrase, however, did not correspond with the reality. The former
partitions had been executed by enemy Powers who had divided the booty
among themselves. At the Crimea the decision was taken by the Allies
of Poland, the Powers who claimed to be ' Poland's friends 3.
The Polish Government found it difficult to conceal their bitterness
over the Crimean * considerations ' of the Big Three. On February 13,
they spoke bluntly :
" On February 12 at 7-30 p.m. the British Foreign Office handed to the
Polish Ambassador in London the text of the resolutions concerning Poland
adopted by President Roosevelt3 Prime Minister Churchill and Marshal
Stalin at the Yalta Conference between February 4 and 11.
" Before the Conference began the Polish Government handed to the
Governments of Great Britain and the United States a Memorandum in
which the hope was expressed that these Governments would not be a
party to any decision regarding the allied Polish State without previous
consultation and without the consent of the Polish Government. At the
same time, the Polish Government declared itself willing to seek the solution
of the dispute initiated by Soviet Russia through normal international pro-
cedure and with due respect for the rights of the two parties concerned.
" In spite of this, the decisions of the Three-Power Conference were pre-
pared and taken, not only without the participation and authorisation of the
Polish Government but also without its knowledge.